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A systems analysis of the processes involved in the esti-
mation of future military needs is presented. A conceptual
model of the estimation procedure is formulated and illus-
trated. Several applicable methods are examined in the
context of practical approaches to the needs estimation
problem. These methods are then evaluated in the framework
of the conceptual model. Finally, a coordinated procedure
is developed which combines several of the most valuable
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E.S. Quade , an experienced and respected analyst at the
RAND Corporation, noted that in performing a systems analysis
"a periodic reappraisal is essential because as the study
progresses the analyst broadens his understanding of its
scope and purpose. Stock-taking that results in junking a
major portion of the work indicates that a reappraisal was
especially necessary" [Ref. 23, p. 360]. The truth of his
statement has become painfully evident in the course of
developing the analytic procedure for this study. During
a long and occasionally frustrating learning process, this
author examined and discarded numerous different approaches
to the problem before settling on the one presented here.
He would therefore like to thank his wife, Michele, and his
advisor, Dr. M.G. Sovereign, for their patience and coopera-
tion during a process which must have appeared to involve a




The process of acquiring major weapons systems for the
Department of Defense (DoD) has been the subject of severe
criticism in recent years. Reports of widespread "gold-
plating" and "cost-overruns" in excess of $30 Billion have
prompted investigations by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) as well as several independent study groups [Ref. 1].
The findings of these investigations have indicated that
one of the principal causes of difficulty is a failure to
adequately identify needs before embarking on new programs.
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard stated
"The most certain way to waste resources is to spend hundreds
of millions of dollars on a (weapon system) development and
then conclude we will not need what we are developing"
[Ref. 2, p. 2].
Since most major acquisition programs are initiated to
provide replacements for existing systems, the specific re-
quirements for them are often simply assumed to be valid
without an investigation of their value in a projected force
structure context. Mr. Packard suggested that this tendency
to "think more in terms of what was effective in the last
war rather than . . . what might be needed for the future" is
a primary cause of development difficulties, and he concluded
that "no viable decision can be made on which weapons should

be developed without knowing in considerable detail what
kind of forces will be needed for the future" [Ref. 2, pp. 2,
3]. The GAO concurred by further commenting that "Our study
of the history of a fairly large sample of weapon systems
leads us to conclude that the function of deciding which
weapons will be developed is not yet being done with the
degree of effectiveness that this important function warrants"
[Ref. 3, P. 71].
B. PURPOSE AND APPROACH
This paper is the first half of a two part study designed
to develop an effective procedure for estimating future
military needs and compare it with actual DoD policies and
practices in order to determine means for improving them.
Since most of the applicable DoD policies are currently
undergoing revision, the portion of the study which addresses
them is being temporarily deferred until they are officially
redefined. This segment, therefore, is concerned only with
the development of a generalized procedural approach.
Specifically, its purpose is to systematically identify and
analyze the requisite components of an effective procedure
for estimating future military needs as a basis for the
planning of exploratory research and development (R&D)
efforts.
In their findings on the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Process, both the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and the Commis-
sion on Government Procurement made several broad recommen-
dations on how such a procedure should be developed. These

recommendations, as interpreted by the author, may be
summarized as follows: Military needs should be estimated
and evaluated within mission areas of the total Defense
structure and should be expressed in terms of capabilities
and concepts rather than systems and hardware [Refs. 4 and
5].
In the process of investigating the components of an
effective estimation procedure, this study examines three
separate facets of the problem: what elements and processes
are involved; what methods are available for dealing with
them; and how these methods can be most productively utilized
The investigation is conducted in the context of a conceptual
model for estimating needs which is developed to illuminate
a systematic procedural methodology through the use of a
decision theory approach involving the processes of assess-
ment, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. The study com-
mences in Chapter Two with a discussion of the inputs to
the model. Next, the several processes involved are intro-
duced and analyzed. Finally, a hypothetical method of
operation for the model is presented.
The third chapter deals with the exploration of several
different methods which have been developed to deal with
the types of problems encountered in needs estimation.
They are presented in terms of their actual application in
this area.
The fourth chapter begins with a comparative evaluation
of the previously introduced methods. It continues with the
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development of a composite procedural approach which
combines selected aspects of the individual methods.
The final chapter summarizes the results of the study




II. CONSTRUCTION OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the estimation of future military needs is accom-
plished within the overall context of force planning, a
survey of the general characteristics of this field provides
insight into the factors and actions involved. Former
Secretary- of Defense Melvin Laird stated that "Acceptable
force planning must be based not only on a definition of
our objectives, but also on a sophisticated analysis of the
nature and relative importance of the various implements and
obstacles to the achievement of our objectives" [Ref. 6,
p. 25]. While this statement does not reflect the tremen-
dous difficulties involved in the force planning process,
it does point out some of the factors which must be Included.
In this study, these factors (objectives, strategies, and
capabilities of friendly and enemy forces) are treated as
the inputs to a conceptual model which utilizes them to
develop statements of future military needs.
In order to develop the characteristics for the concep-
tual model, it is necessary to begin with a description of
its desired output. For the purposes of this study, this
output (future military needs) may be defined as requirements
for new and/or improved capabilities which will correct
projected deficiencies in the military's ability to achieve
its objective in the face of anticipated opposition. Since
12

the statements of these needs are designed for use by R&D
planners, they should contain some rather specific information
of the following description [Ref. 5]*
a) A statement of the deficiency to be corrected and the
various concepts that appear to merit exploration in
this regard.
b) The important objectives to be met by a responsive
development effort, including general capability,
availability, and cost goals.
c) The operational/environmental constraints that must




While not an input per se, the environment has such a
pervasive impact on the specified inputs that it is most
appropriately discussed in this context. It may be defined
as the total situational framework within which ALL elements
and processes of the model are specified and implemented.
Although the term scenario is normally associated with this
definition, it is felt that environment is a more represen-
tative description of the comprehensive nature of the situa-
tional information required for meaningful specification
of the inputs to the model. Examples of important parameters
which must be included are the political, economic, and
sociological conditions which are expected to exist during
a period 10-15 years in the future. Since these parameters
13

comprise the frame of reference for the other aspects of
the model, their determination is one of the most critical
tasks in the development process.
The inputs themselves are separated into three basic
types: objectives; strategies, and capabilities. Although
there are different sets of these inputs for the two opposing
forces in the model, the characteristics of a particular
type of input are assumed to be independent of a "friendly"
or "enemy" designation. The inputs are discussed in this
chapter, therefore, without differentiation of the particular
force involved.
Objectives, in this analysis, are defined as the military
goals established to implement national security policy.
They may vary greatly in both generality and importance
and are highly sensitive to the environment. For instance,
an aircraft carrier in the Caribbean might have a broad
minor objective of conducting general surveillance during
routine operations whereas, in a time of crisis, it might
have the specific and major objective of deterring Cuban air
attacks against its neighbors.
It is, therefore, necessary that the full range and
hierarchy of objectives which apply in a particular situation
be enumerated when specifying this input to the model. It
is also important to examine their sensitivity to the envir-
onment so that appropriate modifications can be made when
different environmental conditions are examined.
14

Another type of input to the model is capabilities.
These are defined as the means used by the military to achieve
its objectives. An example, might be the capability which
an aircraft carrier possesses for projecting firepower
against distant targets. Since capabilities are closely
related to specific systems, such as combat aircraft in
this example, they can be concretely specified in a particu-
lar situation more easily than objectives. It should be
noted, however, that this statement does not imply a one-
to-one correspondence between capabilities and systems.
Some capabilities may require the simultaneous use of
several different systems, while some systems may be able
to provide multiple capabilities. It is, consequently,
necessary to examine the relationships which exist between
the relevant capabilities and systems when specifying this
input to the model.
Strategies are the methods by which capabilities are
utilized to pursue the achievement of objectives. As such,
their primary purpose is to provide a coordinating interface
between the other two types of inputs so that the intentions
and actions of each force in a given situation can be deter-
mined and analyzed. Like objectives, strategies may vary
widely both in generality and in sensitivity to the environ-
ment. For the aircraft carrier in the Carribean, a broad
major strategy under normal conditions might be to monitor
the sea and air traffic entering and leaving Cuba. During
tense periods, however, a specific minor strategy might be
15

to avoid complications by keeping the area clear of friendly
air traffic. Since strategies are highly dependent on both
objectives and capabilities, as well as the environment, the
effects of these other inputs must be carefully considered
in their specification.
C. THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES
There are four different transformation processes in
the conceptual model. The first involves a comparative
assessment of the inputs in order to discover where signi-
ficant deficiencies occur as a result of unfavorable imbal-
ances between the friendly and enemy forces. The second
process concerns an analysis of these deficiencies to
isolate the particular capabilities that require improvement,
The third deals with the synthesis of alternative concepts
for providing such improvement. Finally, the last process
involves iterative evaluations of these concepts under four
important types of considerations.
The comparative assessment process is most easily dis-
cussed in terms of specific interactions between opposing
forces. It entails a detailed analysis of the inputs in
order to determine the respective intentions and tactics
of the opposing forces. This data is then used to compare
the relative strength and effectiveness of the forces in
order to discover where friendly deficiencies occur.
The analysis of deficiencies in order to isolate the
particular capabilities involved is a less complex task
16

than comparative assessment, but Is often more difficult.
It requires the translation of data in terms such as numbers
of aircraft destroyed or amounts of territory lost into
meaningful information concerning weaknesses in specific
capabilities. Once this has been accomplished, the isolated
weaknesses are further analyzed to determine whether they
are most appropriately corrected by an increase in the quan-
tity or an improvement in the quality of forces. Since this
study is oriented toward R&D planning, only those deficien-
cies which indicate a need for developmental improvement
are pursued.
The third process which occurs in the model concerns
the synthesis of alternative concepts for correction of the
capability weaknesses that have been isolated. These con-
cepts are necessarily very general in nature and should in-
clude Innovative as well as traditional methods for providing
the type of capability involved. Also, their range should
be as broad as possible in order to counteract the normal
military tendency to focus on a single "preferred" approach.
The iterative evaluations occur as a result of four
different types of environmentally related considerations
which affect the validity of the concepts synthesized in
the preceding process. Their purpose is to eliminate those
concepts which are clearly invalid and to provide amplifying/
qualifying data for those which are approved for inclusion
in needs statements. Although they are discussed and illus-
trated in an apparently sequential fashion, they should be
17

performed simultaneously in order to examine the trade-offs
involved.
The first type of evaluation deals with the operational
usability of a concept. It is vitally important because
the investment in a development based on an unusable concept
is ultimately wasted. An example of such a situation in-
volved the projected utilization of the C5A. An extensive
development effort was undertaken to provide this aircraft
with an expensive specially constructed landing gear system
for use on both concrete and dirt runways. This effort was
in response to a clearly unrealistic concept of utilizing
this extremely large and vulnerable aircraft to transport
troops into unimproved forward areas. In order to prevent
such problems, it is necessary to evaluate proposed concepts
in light of the operational conditions involved in their
anticipated usage.
A second type of evaluation concerns the technical feasi-
bility (including performance, cost, and schedule considera-
tions) for a particular concept. The question here is
whether an effective system based on the concept could be
developed for an acceptable cost in the time frame desired.
This evaluation entails a survey of projected technology in
applicable fields as its primary source of information and
involves extensive trade-offs between the three parameters
concerned.
An example of the need for this kind of evaluation
concerns the concept for the supersonic transport (SST)
18

which was developed by Boeing in the 1960 T s. As a result
of many difficult engineering problems, numerous schedule
delays, and skyrocketing costs, its development was finally
terminated after the expenditure of vast amounts of time and
money.
The third type of evaluation process involves the stra-
tegic considerations that may be involved in the enemy res-
ponse to a particular development effort. A concept that is
expected to evoke a strong or dangerous response may not be
tenable in this context. The need for this type of evalua-
tion is clearly illustrated in the controversy which surround-
ed the development of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) in
the middle 1960's. While many proponents of this tremendously
complex and costly system argued that it was vital to the
nation's defense, its critics felt that it was not a tenable
concept. They argued that it would undoubtedly promote further
armament escalations and would consequently be quickly
neutralized by compensatory enemy developments.
The final type of evaluation in the model concerns the
domestic political considerations associated with develop-
ments based on a particular concept. The question is whether
a concept might involve implications that would be considered
unacceptable by the electorate and/or Congress. An example
of this type of situation can be found in the abandonment
of the Navy's Fast Deployment Logistics Ship (PDL) concept.
DoD presented this concept as a necessary and cost-effective
improvement to the Sealift capability. It encountered
19

political opposition in two major areas, however, which
ultimately forced its cancellation. First, commercial
shippers united in opposition to the FDL because they feared
it would curtail DoD's use of civilian cargo carriers. Also,
several Senators feared that the concept would encourage
undesirable U.S. involvement in "police-action" conflicts
by making the movement of troops and supplies into overseas
areas too fast and convenient for the exercise of adequate
restraint.
Those concepts which are considered worthy of explora-
tion after evaluation are combined with the deficiency they
are to correct and appropriate amplifying/qualifying data
into a statement of need as described in the introduction
to this chapter.
D. A MODUS OPERANDI
The general flow of operations in the model and the
characteristics associated with each section are depicted
in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. In order to illustrate
this methodology more clearly, the following simple hypo-
thetical example is presented.
As part of an analysis undertaken to determine the quick
response effectiveness of U.S. general purpose forces in
the environment projected for the 1983-1988 time frame, a
specific environmental situation is considered in which U.S.
Marine amphibious forces are engaged in a police-action
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Figure 2. CONCEPTUAL MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
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oil-rich Middle Eastern nation. An in-depth analysis of this
situation aids in the specification of the objectives, strat-
egies and capabilities of both opponents. A comparative
analysis of the forces involved indicates that the American
force is suffering casualties at an unacceptable rate.
Further investigation reveals that the apparent reason for
the losses is an imbalance in the air support available
to the two opponents. Specifically, the Arabs possess a
Soviet-built close air support aircraft against which the
American forces cannot adequately defend. An analysis of
this deficiency reveals that it is not feasibly correctable
through increases in force levels due to the non-existence
of an adequate air defense capability or sufficient friendly
air support in the environment involved. It is determined
that the deficiency results in a 75% probability of survival
from a single air attack and a 50% probability for successful
conduct of sustained operations. An improvement in capa-
bility is desired which will increase these probabilities
to 95$ and 75$ respectively. It is predicted that any one
of a number of different concepts for providing the improved
capability would be both operationally usable and technically
feasible. Additional evaluations are performed to discover
the effects of any strategic or political implications which
may be involved. When they are determined to be negligible
in all respects, the following statement of need is developed
and promulgated to the R&D community.
23

a) A need exists for an advanced system to protect
amphibious ground troops against air attack. While
no currently projected systems are adequate, various
concepts involving field operated missiles, laser
weapons, or electronic countermeasures (ECM) devices
appear to merit consideration.
b) The goal for a responsive system is provision of a
95% probability of survival from a single air attack
and a 75% probability for the safe conduct of extended
operations in a vulnerable environment. The single
attack survivability criteria is considered more
important than the criteria for extended operations.
The capability should be available in the 1985 time
frame and development efforts should be funded within
the constraints set forth for normal exploratory/
advanced development projects.
c) Since the capability should be provided by a system
that can be operated by front line troops in the field,
such a system should be easily transportable, relatively
maintenance-free, and operable by individuals with a
minimum of formal training.
24

III. INVESTIGATION OF APPLICABLE METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
The conceptual model developed in the previous chapter
is rather difficult to "operationalize" due to a number of
different problems. These problems arise primarily from
three sources: The difficulties involved in adequately
specifying the inputs; the tremendous complexity of the
included processes; and the general uncertainty inherent
in long-range estimation efforts. A number of different
approaches to the tractable management of these problems
have been developed.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce several of
these approaches as illustrations of alternative methodolo-
gies for the estimation of future military needs. As shown
in Figure 3» there is considerable variance among these
methods in usage and mathematical rigor as well as in pro-
cedural approach. Although the various approaches are not
explicitly compared or evaluated in this chapter, it should
be emphasized that the reason for introducing them is to
demonstrate several tools which could be useful in the con-
struction of a composite approach in the framework of the
conceptual model.
Since the examples presented here are relatively con-
densed and abbreviated, readers who are especially interested
in a particular approach are encouraged to consult the
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The traditional process of determining needs in DoD is
based upon the assessment of a threat and the proposal of
development concepts to counter it. Almost every require-
ments document published by the Department references some
type of threat analysis as its justification [Ref. 7]- It
is appropriate, therefore, that the first method discussed
in this chapter should involve a variant of this procedure.
The approach employed in developing a draft of the Technology
Coordinating Paper for weapons development (a document being
published by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering)
was chosen for this purpose because it is substantially
independent of environmental considerations. Whereas
most attempts at threat assessment are based on a detailed
description of the environment in which the assessment is
made [Ref. 8], this approach is more concerned with an
objective evaluation of the characteristics of comparable
weapons. These evaluations are made in the following four
contexts.
a) In a face-to-face comparison of a friendly weapon
versus an enemy target , threat is constituted by
higher survivability of the target.
The information concerning this approach is based on
personal interviews with Dr. R.N. Stolfi of the Naval
Postgraduate School who coordinated development of the
threat analysis for the document involved.
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b) In a face-to-face comparison of an enemy weapon
against a friendly target , threat is constituted by
extreme vulnerability of the target.
c) In a side-by-side comparison of the performance
characteristics for similar friendly and enemy weapons,
threat is constituted by superior performance of the
enemy weapons
.
d) In an evaluation of projected enemy weapons technology,
threat is constituted by anticipated innovative advances
or breakthroughs.
In the Weapons Technology Coordinating Paper, the
threats (see Figure 4 for example) identified by this pro-
cedure provide the rationale for a survey of weapons-associ-
ated technology. The objective of this survey is a determin-
ation of the ability of the technological fields concerned
to provide new/improved systems which show promise of
effectively countering the identified threats.
While this procedure has obvious drawbacks, including
its failure to consider the effects of quantity/quality
tradeoffs, it does offer an interesting method for elimin-
ating the "scenario dependancy" which is inherent in most
threat assessments and requirements statements.
C. DELPHI
An interesting Delphi-type approach to needs estimation
can be found in A Study of Deterrence which pursues the
following objectives [Ref. 9, p. 1]:
28








PART B: Threat == Vulnerability of Target
^Friendly Target Enemy Weapon Threat
Foot Soldier AK47 High
PART C: Threat = Superior Enemy Performance
Friendly Weapon Enemy Weapon Threat
M16 AK^7 Medium
Due to higher reliability of AK47
PART D: Threat = Faster Enemy Progress








Due .to enemy advances in laser research
Figure 4. THREAT ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE
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a) "To forecast American defense needs in the decades of
of the seventies, eighties, and nineties."
b) "To compare and analyze national security strategies
with national objectives."
c) "To relate specific weapons systems or mixes to national
strategies.
"
d) "To evaluate future weapons systems and national
security strategies with national objectives."
The approach used in the study employs a combination of the
Delphi technique and cross-impact analysis. In order to
facilitate understanding of this methodology, a brief
description of these two analytic tools follows.
The Delphi Technique is designed to produce a consensus
opinion among a group of experts through an iterative process
of individual interrogations and feedback [Ref. 10]. It was
developed at the RAND Corporation in an effort to rectify
some of the biasing effects inherent in group discussions.
These effects principally concern the tendency for the
dominant members of a group to monopolize the discussion and
the pressure for unanimity exerted by holders of the majority
opinion. Delphi alleviates these problems by physically
separating the members of the group and by utilizing the
devices of anonymity, controlled feedback, and statistical
group response. These devices provide for several rounds of
private interviews with each member of the group. During
the interviews, the members are presented with summarized
results of the previous round, including the median and
30

deviation of the responses , and are requested to reply with
revised and/or refined opinions (supported by appropriate
justification if significantly different from the median)
.
This process is generally repeated for three or four iterations
or until the deviation of the responses is considered suffi-
ciently small.
Cross-Impact analysis is "a family of techniques that try
to evaluate changes in the likelihood of occurrence among an
entire set of possible future events and trends in light of
limited changes in probability for some of the items in that
set" [Ref. 9, p. 32]. It involves the construction of
matrices in order to enumerate and evaluate the inter-
relationships which exist among different sets of elements
(see Figure 5). The combination of this technique with Delphi
provides a means for simultaneously identifying and evaluating
both individual elements and the linkages between them.
The Study in Deterrence uses three sequential applications of
this combination to predict, in turn, the nation's objectives,
capabilities, and' strategies for the period 10-30 years in
the future
.
Delphi One is concerned with determining and scaling "the
specific goals and objectives of the United States in the area
of National Security Affairs" [Ref. 9, P- 31- It approaches
this task by dividing National Security Goals into the
categories of Deterrence, Defense, Maintenance Acquisition,
and Development (with appropriate specific goals in each





In order to investigate the relationships
between four strategies (A,B,C,D) and three
objectives (X,Y,Z), a cross-impact matrix
could be constructed and evaluated as follows










+ 2 -1 -2
+4 +1
-4 + 2 + 3
-1 + 3 -2 1
where:
+1 to +5 denotes increasingly positive effect
denotes no effect
-1 to -5 denotes increasingly negative effect
Figure 5. ILLUSTRATION OF A CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX
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AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS Value Priority
Deterrence of Strategic Nuclear Warfare
Deterrence of Limited Nuclear '.warfare
Deterrence of Theater Conventional Warfare
Deterrence of Sub-Theater or Localized
Warfare
Defense of American Peculation Centers
Defense of National Command Authority
Defense of American Economic System
Defense of American Military and Military
Support System
Defense of American Retaliatory Forces-
Defense of American Territory
Maintenance of American Collective
Security System
Maintenance of NATO Alliance in its
Present Form
Maintenance of SEATO Alliance in its
Present Form
Maintenance of the OAS
Maintenance of Present Middle East Balance
of Power
Maintenance of East Asian Balance of Power
Maintenance of Status Quo in South Asia
Maintenance of Strategic Sufficiency
Maintenance of Technological Superiority
Acquisition of Further Strategic Arms
Limitation
Acquisition of Limitation of Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation
Acquisition of Favorable Balance of Trade
Acquisition of Necessary Raw Materials and
World Markets
Development of a New Atlantic Alliance
Development of a New Economic Relationship
with Jaoan
Development of a New Economic Relationship
with PRC
Development of a New Economic Relationship
with USSR
Development of Economic, Social, Political
Stability in Latin America
Development of Economic, Social, Political
Stability in Africa
Development of Economic, Social, Political
Stability in South Asia
Development of Economic, Social, Political
Stability in East Asia
Development of European Integration i
Figure 6. DELPHI ONE
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to indicate the individual worth of each goal (on a scale of
-1 to +3) and its relative priority within the entire set
(on a scale of 1 to 9).
Delphi Two has as its objective the determination of the
strategies which can best assure achievement of the objec-
tives established in Delphi One. It endeavors to discover
"the possible range of strategic options, and then to scale
these options in terms o f preference, utility, and probability
of effectiveness" [Ref. 9» p. 3]- The procedure utilized
delineates a number of possible strategies and policy attri-
butes (Figure 7) and calls for respondents to evaluate them
in three different contexts. First, the policy attributes
are ranked in order of importance (Figure 8) . Second, in a
cross-impact context, the strategies are evaluated against
the objectives established in Delphi One in terms of whether
each of the strategies (in turn) is beneficial, neutral, or
detrimental to the achievement of each of the objectives
(Figure 9). Finally, in a similar manner, the strategies
are evaluated against the various policy attributes in terms
of the natures (positive, negative, or zero) of the corre-
lations which exist between them (Figure 10).
The objective of Delphi Three is "to determine, in kind
and quantity, the general weapons system types necessary to
carry out the optimum National Security Strategies of the
United States" [Ref 9 S p. 4]. The weapons systems are
divided into categories according to their usage, such as




Unrestricted Nuclear Selective Targeting
Countervalue Nuclear Counterforce Nuclear
Offensive Nuclear Defensive Nuclear
Pre-Emptive Nuclear
Offensive Conventional Defensive Conventional









Figure 7. DELPHI TWO STRATEGIES AND POLICY ATTRIBUTES
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RANKING OF POLICY ATTRIBUTES
This is an attempt to determine preferences as to the
ordering of importance of policy attributes using a special
statistical technique. Notice that the matrix below has
identical rows and columns, but that only half the matrix
is provided. Starting with the attribute in row #1, compare
this attribute to the attribute in every column for which
there is a square to fill. If the row attribute is
preferred to the column attribute, place a "1" in the square;
if vice-versa, place a "0" in the square. Repeat this
procedure for each row until the half-matrix is entirely




















In the matrix below, strategies are listed as rows and
goals are listed as columns. Starting with the strategy
in row #1, evaluate the strategy against the goal in each
column according to the following scoring system:
1 - the strategy is severely detrimental
to the accomplishment of the goal.
2 - the strategy hinders the accomplishment
of the goal.
3 - the strategy neither hinders nor
contributes to the accomplishment of the goal
4 - the strategy contributes to the
accomplishment of the goal.
5 - the strategy is very beneficial to the
accomplishment of the goal.
Repeat this procedure for each row. Remember, each
strategy is to be considered independently of all other
strategies.






Figure 9. DELPHI TWO, PART B
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STRATEGY VERSUS POLICY ATTRIBUTE
This section is identical in method to part B, except
the following scoring system is used:
1 - the strategy possesses the opposite of
the listed attribute.
2 - the strategy has neither the attribute
nor the opposite.







Figure 10. DELPHI TWO, PART C
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The respondents are requested to predict the technological
feasibility of various concepts for advanced weapons (Figure
11). They are also asked to evaluate the cross impact cf
these concepts in terms of their usefulness in implementing
the Delphi Two strategies (Figure 12)
.
Although this Study is not yet completed and is therefore
very difficult to objectively evaluate at the present time,
it does appear to offer an interesting approach to the
difficult problem of predicting such subjective and
judgemental elements of national security policy as objec-
tives and strategies.
D. RELEVANCE TREE
Planning Assistance Through Evaluation of Relevance
Numbers (PATTERN) is a procedure designed by Honeywell to
"help pinpoint which of thousands of possible alternative
research and development projects are most likely to provide
maximum payoff in advancing important national-military
objectives" [Ref. 12, p. 56]. Its methodology employs a type
of hierarchal network known as a relevance tree to explicitly
determine and display the relative importance of different
specifically defined elements to the achievement of broadly
defined goals . •
The PATTERN procedure is initiated with a detailed
projectivion of the environment for the time frame under
consideration. Within this context, a relevance tree is





1 - Possibly infeasible

















1. Biological weapons (Lethal)
2. Biological weapons (Temporarily debilitating)
3. Chemical weapons (Lethal)
4. Chemical weapons (Temporarily debilitating)
5. Submarine-launched nuclear weapons
6. Land-based missile delivered nuclear weapons
7. Fixed-platform, underwater-launched nuclear
weapons
b. Manned bomber delivered nuclear weapons
9. Doomsday machine










1. Anti-ballistic missile forces (ABM)
2. Continental air defense systems less ABM
3. Civil defense systems (Shelters, under-
ground industry
4. Continental land defense forces




1. Mobile land defense forces (STRAF and
Marines
2. Naval tactical air forces
3. Land-based tactical air forces
4. Sea control forces (Carriers, surface,
cruise-missile ships)
Figure 11. DELPHI THREE, PART A
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In this Delphi iteration, rate the capability of various
types of weapons systems to implement the previously
delineated strategies. It is assumed at this point that all
of the types of weapons systems listed below are in fact
feasible
.
In the following matrix, rank the capability of each type
of weapon system to implement each strategy. A ranking of
to 4 as defined below should be used:
- No capability. The weapons system is of no use in
implementing the strategy.
1 - Slight capability. The weapons system may be
capable of partially implementing
the strategy under some circumstances
2 - Moderate capability. The weapons system is capable
of implementing the strategy under
most circumstances in conjunction
with other weapons systems.
3 - Large capability. The weapons system has significant
capability to implement the strategy,
but could be replaced by another
system or combination of systems.
4 - Essential. The strategy cannot be implemented
without this type of weapons system,
WEAPON VERSUS STRATEGY






Figure 12. DELPHI THREE, PART B
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The upper section is concerned with overall strategies for
achieving national objectives. It is divided into three
separate levels which respectively delinate the types of
conflict, forms of conflict, and missions which are involved
in the development of these strategies. The center section
deals with the capabilities that are required to implement
the chosen strategies. Its two levels consist of the concepts
and the functional subsystems involved in providing these
capabilities. The lower section concerns the technological
considerations involved in the development of the required
capabilities. Its levels include subsystem configuration and
technology deficiencies. Each of the levels, in turn, is
broken down into elements which delineate the alternatives
which are applicable at each level of the tree.
When a tree has been constructed and broken down into
elements for each level, a team of experts assigns relative
numerical values to these elements on the basis of prede-
termined weighted criteria [Ref. 14}. These values are
assigned in the following manner. First, the criteria
involved in a particular section of the hierarchy are given
relative weights (in accordance with their importance)
which sum to unity for all criteria in that section. Then,
the elements on a particular node of the tree are assigned
relative values under each of criteria applicable to it.
These values are assigned in such a way that the sum of all
the element-criteria valuations on a given node sum to unity.
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By a series of element value multiplications along a
linear trace "up" the tree, it is ostensibly possible to
determine the relative importance of upgrading a particular
element in terms of its individual effect on national
objectives.
The following series of figures illustrates the PATTERN
structure just described. Figure 13 shows the basic struc-
ture of the tree with suggested general ranking criteria for
each section on the left and a hierarchy of the levels within
the sections on the right. Figure 14 provides an example
of a network structure which displays the elements that might
comprise the top four levels of the tree. Figure 15 illus-
trates the numerical relationships among various levels in
the context of an annotated relevance tree, showing the
values placed on the elements of each node.
The numerical values provided in this manner comprise
the major portion of the PATTERN data base. There are,
however, two other sources of data which contribute to the
final determination of relevance numbers for the elements
in the tree. These sources are analyses of status/timing
and cross support. Status/timing concerns the feasibility
of correcting specific technical deficiencies listed on the
lowest level of the relevance tree. A technological fore-
cast, which predicts the future state-of-the art in the
field(s) of technology concerned, is used as a basis for
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Figure 15. AN ANNOTATED PARTIAL RELEVANCE TREE
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of the probability that they can be corrected in the time
frame specified.
The third component of the data results from a survey
of the relationships that exist between different techno-
logical fields. On the basis of this survey, values are
assigned to the deficiencies to denote the general extent
that the correction of a particular deficiency will encourage
or aid the correction of deficiencies in related areas.
When all of the data has been developed for the three
steps involved in the PATTERN procedure, it is compiled and
analyzed through an automated process in order to produce
a set of relevance numbers which indicates the priorities
for upgrading individual elements in terms of their value
to the achievement of national objectives.
As an indication of the complexity involved in a full
PATTERN analysis, Honeywell developed and evaluated the




•3 types of activity








While this approach contains a number of specific
virtues and pitfalls, its primary value in determining needs
appears to be the methodology it employs for displaying the
general hierarchical structure rather than prioritizing the
individual elements. Also, only the top five levels of the
tree are applicable to the needs estimation problem as
defined in this study.
E. FUNCTIONAL NETWORK
The functional network approach utilized in the Military
Requirements Analysis Generation (MIRAGE) studies performed
by Lockheed attacks the deficiency determination and evalua-
tion problem from a mission oriented point of view. This
procedure involves the development of extensive networks
which outline the relationships that exist between missions,
capabilities, and systems. These networks form the framework
within which operational needs are isolated and corrective
concepts are proposed. Their development grew out of a
study performed at the RAND Corporation which attempted to
illuminate the difficulties associated with planning for
general purpose force structure requirements [Ref. 15].
The functional network analysis procedure (Figure 16)
begins with the development of a set of environment scenarios
which delineate a full range of conflict situations which
are deemed possible for the time frame under consideration
(see Figure 17). This information forms the basis for a
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are likely to be employed [Ref. 16]. The next step is a
delineation of the missions which will be required in support
of these concepts (Figures 18, 19). Each mission leads to
the development of a detailed series of flow charts which
outline the various types of capabilities required and weapons
available for performing the different missions involved.
Figures 20-22 provide an illustrative example of this process.
By showing both capability requirements and systems avail-
ability together, the flow charts readily point out deficien-
cies which comprise the weaknesses within each mission area.
These weaknesses are then ranked in terms of their importance
by use of the following (PATTERN-like) procedure [Ref. 17, p.
81]:
a) "relate the missions by means of relevance numbers."
b) "assign 'likelihood' values to scenarios."
c) "combine the values of a) and b) to ascertain relative
mission needs."
d) "rank the weaknesses isolated within each mission area."
e) "combine the values of c) and d) to asecertain relative
functional needs."
After the various weaknesses are identified and prioritized,
detailed technological forecasts are consulted and advanced
concepts for correcting them are synthesized and evaluated
for feasibility.
This procedure possesses a highly desirable character-
istic not evident in the approaches discussed previously in
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Both B and C
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some oircraft X
(in the future A also
deliverable by X
)
End FY 1963 quantity
620 Air Force and 100 Navy
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complex inter-relationships which exists between capabili-
ties and systems in the area of general purpose forces. For
this reason it shows promise of being particularly valuable
in any effort to realistically estimate future military
needs.
F. SIMULATION
The final approach to be analyzed in the chapter is an
extremely complex and highly automated force simulation
system called FOREWON, which was developed by the Research
Analysis Corporation (RAC) for use in the Army's program
planning process [Ref. 18]. Although this system differs
from the approaches previously discussed in that it is
oriented toward optimization of force structure rather than
isolation of deficiencies , it provides insight into a type
of simulation system currently in DoD usage which might be
adapted to the needs estimation procedure (see Figure 23
for a system flow chart).
The principal input to FOREWON is the Design Group of
Multi-Theater Operations (DGMTO) which contains a set of
scenarios for a particular strategy of multi-theater opera-
tions. The first operative module is the Preliminary Force
Designer (PFD) which develops a combat troop list for exe-
cution of a DGMTO. This list is fed to the more detailed
Theater Force Designer (TFD), which consists of the ATLAS
combat simulation model, which conducts and evaluates the























generates support requirements. While the ATLAS results are
printed out directly, the FASTALS lists are fed into the Lift
System Designer (LSD) and the Objective Force Designer (OFD)
.
These modules, respectively, generate the design and cost
for an appropriate transportation system and compile an
overall optimal troop list. Finally, this optimal troop
list is fed into the Force Cost Assessor (FCA) which computes
and reports the cost of transitioning from an initial force
to the objective force [Ref. 19].
While the system employs highly iterative procedures,
as illustrated in the chart, a simplified "straight-through"
version of the operational flow is illustrated by the follow-
ing example. First, a DGMTO covering several contingencies
is developed and fed into the PFD. The resulting initial
combat troop list is inputted to ATLAS which evaluates its
combat effectiveness and FASTALS which generates its support
requirements. These lists are then used by the LSD to com-
pute transportation requirements and the OFD to develop the
objective force. Finally, the FCA computes the incremental
costs associated with the transition from the initial to
the objective force.
Although this discussion provides a very brief descrip-
tion of the system's operation, it is only intended to illus-
trate the general character and complexity of the processes
involved. Since the ATLAS combat simulation model is of
particular importance to the system's applicability in this










operational data from scenario
tactical air and logistical resources












immediate interpretations of situation
(perhaps return to PREGAME PREPARATION)
RESULTS
complete analysis*
* This analysis includes a comprehensive review of all
inputs, parameters, and objectives. The run might be repeated
several times in order to achieve satisfactory results.
Throughout the above steps there is an implied recycle
capability to ensure credible outputs from each previous step.
Figure 24. SUMMARY OF ATLAS RUN
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The ATLAS model is actually composed of four different
submodels (Figure 25): the tactical decision model; the
logistics model; the tactical air model; and the ground
combat model. These four sub-models are coordinated in such
a way that each of them is involved in determining the move-
ment of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), the
model's decision variable which basically represents the
point of contact between the two opposing forces. The
involvement of each of these sub models in determining FEBA
movement is indicated by the following assessment criteria
[Ref. 19, P. 45"]:
a) the firepower of each side after accounting for
casualties and replacements
b) the days of supply available to the combat troops
c) the effects of aircraft assigned to close air support
(CAS) missions
d) the nature of the terrain over which the fighting
takes place.
e) the tactical posture of the combatants.
The FOREWON system, and particularly the ATLAS combat
simulator, possess characteristics which may be desirable
in the needs estimation process. They appear to be concep-
tually adaptable to the difficult task of comparatively
assessing opposing forces in order to uncover "qualitative"
deficiencies. Consequently, they will be evaluated more



















IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPOSITE PROCEDURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The second chapter of this study outlined the factors
and processes which should be included in a thorough and
comprehensive procedure for the estimation of future military
needs. The third chapter presented several applicable
methods for approaching the needs estimation problem, as
illustrated by actual examples of their usage in this field.
The purpose of this fourth chapter is to evaluate these
various approaches in the framework of the conceptual model
in order to determine a composite procedure which combines
the most desirable aspects of the individual methods.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to a com-
parative analysis of the various approaches presented in
Chapter Three. They are evaluated both in terms of their
own particular advantages and disadvantages as separate
needs estimation procedures and in terms of their interface
with the conceptual model presented in Chapter Two (refer
back to Figures 1 and 2 for a summary of the model)
.
The final section of the chapter attempts to combine the
advantageous aspects of the individual methods into a coor-
dinated approach which satisfies the requirements embodied
in each section of the conceptual model. It concludes with




B. EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL METHODS
Each of the methods introduced in the previous chapter
has its own peculiar advantages and disadvantages for appli-
cation to the task of estimating needs. This section dis-
cusses the pertinent characteristics of these methods in
order to determine their particular usefulness in the esti-
mation of needs and their consequent applicability to the
various components of this study's conceptual model.
The most readily apparent general attribute of the Threat/
Response method is the fact that it is understood and accepted
as the result of long usage. It is also a relatively simple
and straightforward process to perform, since appropriate
data on enemy capabilities and systems is fairly readily
available from the intelligence community. As mentioned
previously, a unique and valuable advantage of the particular
variant of this method used in the Weapons TCP is that it
is NOT scenario dependent. On the negative side, the Threat/
Response methodology does not provide for consideration of
the trade-offs between increases in numbers versus improve-
ments in quality of weapons. It also does not address the
importance of a particular threat in terms of overall
national security. These considerations tend to promote
"worst case" planning in which an attempt is made to counter
all perceived threats individually and simultaneously.
In terms of the model, this method's treatment of capa-
bilities is good, but objectives and strategies are ignored
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and, as noted, environmental considerations are eliminated.
It offers a crude but fairly simple comparative assessment
process which is valuable in isolating strictly qualitative
deficiencies in "one-on-one" type situations. Its conclu-
sions, however, are often misleading since they do not
consider quantity/quality trade-offs. Its provision for
the evaluation of corrective concepts is oriented toward
technical considerations exclusively and completely ignores
important operational, strategic and political questions.
The Delphi method, as illustrated by A Study in Deterrence
contains several desirable characteristics for inclusion in
a needs estimation procedure. It provides a comparatively
"bias free" methodology for utilizing a consensus of expert
opinion in the prediction and/or evaluation of difficult
to quantify factors and considerations. It also provides
results which are usually "reproducible," which is a definite
advantage for a judgemental type technique. On the other
hand, the quality of its results is highly dependent on the
expertise of the selected respondents. Also, the device of
controlled feedback constrains the free exchange of informa-
tion which prevails in a face-to-face brain-storming session.
In terms of the model, this method appears generally
well-suited for the prediction of the judgemental type inputs
such as objectives, strategies, and the environments. It
also shows promise in the evaluation of concepts for opera-
tional usability, technical feasibility, strategic tenability
and political acceptability. Its main drawback in terms of
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the model is that it offers no adequate method for the
matching of capabilities to systems or the comparative
assessment of opposing forces with subsequent identification
of deficiencies.
The Relevance Tree methodology used in PATTERN is theo-
retically well adapted to the task of estimating needs due
to its well defined hierarchical, structure and provision for
establishing the relative importance of alternatives. Spe-
cifically, it provides a systematic procedure for the identi-
fication and prioritization of particular technical deficien-
cies which threaten national security. This procedure,
however, utilizes a numerical weighting methodology (as
depicted in Figure 14) which implies an unrealistic degree
of precision. Relevance numbers provide a valuable tool for
ranking limited numbers of distinct alternatives, but it does
not appear reasonable to assume that they can provide (as
PATTERN suggests) a clearly defined ordering of priorities
for 2000 different technical deficiencies.
In terms of the conceptual model, the relevance tree
method offers an interesting structure for the specification
of inputs but does not contain a well-defined process for
how they should be specified. It also does not offer any
means of conducting a comparative assessment of opposing
forces or nontechnical evaluations of concepts. Its princi-
pal value for the model, therefore, lies in its well-defined




The Functional Network approach embodied in the MIRAGE
studies is the only method analyzed which specifically
addresses the complex relationships that exist between capa-
bilities and systems. By delineating these relationships
in a mission flow chart context, it illuminates the various
strong and weak points in the capabilities of a given force
structure. Unfortunately, however, meaningful flow charts
are tremendously complicated and are, consequently, extremely
difficult to construct and/or interpret.
In terms of the model, the MIRAGE procedure utilizes a
detailed environmental analysis to determine probable
"scenarios" and specify the various inputs. Deficiencies
are isolated strictly through use of the mission flow charts
and no explicit means of comparative assessment or nontech-
nical evaluation of concepts is included. Since all other
characteristics of this approach are basically similar to
those found in PATTERN, its primary unique value lies in
the comprehensive environmental analysis which initiates it
and the mission flow charts which relate capabilities and
systems
.
The Simulation method used in the FOREWON System is
unique among the approaches examined because of its emphasis
on comparative assessment of opposing forces in strictly
quantitative terms. It also provides for an iterative ana-
lytic/evaluation process which can be used in determining the
nature and extent of deficiencies. Because of its highly
automated nature and consequent strict requirement for
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quantified inputs, it entails the use of specific decision
rules in order to eliminate the judgemental aspects of
combat. Also, because it uses fairly crude techniques to
analyze extremely complicated situations, it requires many
simplifying assumptions in order to accommodate its relatively
low degree of sophistication.
In terms of the model, the FOREWON approach uses standard
military intelligence and planning guidance documents as a
basis for the specification of the environments, objectives,
strategies, and capabilities for the DGMTO. The comparative
assessment and identification of deficiencies are jointly
provided by the PFD and ATLAS model during a series of itera-
tive operations. The analysts must manually alter the force
structures between iterations in order to analyze the nature
and extent of the identified deficiencies. No provision
is currently included for the synthesis or evaluation of
new concepts, but a procedure for the incorporation of this
feature is currently under development [Ref. 20].
The primary value of the FOREWON approach in the context
of this study is the fact that it effectively validates the
structure of the conceptual model. While FOREWON and the
model are significantly dissimilar in several respects, most
of these dissimilarities can be directly attributed to the
distinction between their respective purposes (i.e. mid-range
force structure planning versus long-range needs estimation)
.
It is in the areas most affected by this distinction, where
qualitative/judgemental considerations are involved, that
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other methods appear better suited to the needs estimation
problem.
The foregoing discussion makes it readily apparent that,
while each of the individual methods has its own peculiar
advantageous characteristics, none of them is totally ade-
quate to perform all of the processes contained in the
conceptual model (see Figure 26). The next section, there-
fore, describes a composite approach which selectively
combines these methods in order to exploit their respective
benefits in a coordinated manner.
C. COORDINATION OF COMBINED METHODS
This section is concerned with the determination of a
coordinated set of methods to be used in "operationalizing"
the conceptual model. For the sake of clarity, it discusses
the methods to be used for the various operations in accord-
ance with the order in which these operations occur in the
model (see Figure 27 for a summary). Before the methods
themselves can be intelligently discussed, however, it is
necessary to describe the structure in which they are combined
The first consideration in the procedural development is
the question of administration. Since it was stated in
Chapter One that the approach should be structured in a
mission-oriented context and should be systematic in nature,
it should be administered by a group of experienced analysts
who collectively possess a wide range of expertise in both
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group is the development of an imaginative and comprehensive
environmental analysis (of the type used in MIRAGE) for the
period 10-15 years in the future. This analysis is vitally
important because it forms the basic framework for the
remainder of the estimation procedure.
The environmental analysis is initially used as a
foundation on which the analysts hypothesize relevant param-
eters (including alternative objectives, strategies, and
capabilities for both opponents) for the probable conflict
situations identified. These environments and associated
parameters are then "validated" by a select group of civilian
and military officials (from the State Department as well as
all components of DoD) in one of three ways: informal oral
discussion in a committee atmosphere; formal written
commentary through the chain-of-command; use of the Delphi
technique. Because of the difficulties traditionally
encountered with the first two methods, Delphi is considered
the most appropriate method for validation. The Panel's
Initial task in this Delphi is to evaluate the possible
environments envisioned by the analysts, in order to validate
their realism and likelihood. Next, the panel successively
identifies in a cross-impact context the appropriate inter-
sections of the listed objectives, strategies, and capabilities
of the opposing forces in each of the environments. The
overall result of this Delphi is the delineation of probable
conflict environments for the period under consideration;
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with the likely objectives, strategies, and capabilities
of the opposing forces specified for each one.
Taking the information from the validation Delphi as
input data, the four transformational processes of the model
can be initiated. The first step in this section of the
procedure is the development of mission flow charts with
which to translate general capabilities to specific systems.
By comparing the capability requirements provided by the
Delphi process to the flow charts, the types of systems
utilized by each opponent in a particular conflict situation
can be determined. This data can then be coordinated with
opposing strategies to form the input for the comparative
assessment process.
If only an approximate and strictly qualitative deline-
ation of deficiencies is needed, the Threat Analysis method
can be used. If, however, quality/quantity tradeoff consid-
erations are involved, the Simulation approach is appropriate
By selectively adjusting the parameters between successive
simulations of a conflict environment, the identified defi-
ciencies in the friendly force can be individually analyzed
to determine their respective gravity and urgency. Those
deficiencies which are not correctable by realistic increases
in force levels are further analyzed through use of the
mission flow charts to isolate the capabilities involved as
a basis for the synthesis of corrective concepts. The
synthesis process itself is best accomplished in a "brain-
storming" context designed to produce a broad range of
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concepts as Insurance against the prevalent military
tendency to concentrate on a single (preferred) alternative.
Once the initial set of concepts has been synthesized
for the correction of a particular deficiency, the next step
is to evaluate and refine it in order to "separate the wheat
from the chaff" prior to the expenditure of time and money
on R&D efforts. The four types of evaluations required are
optimally performed by experts from. the operational, techni-
cal, strategic, and political fields, respectively. They
can be performed in any one of three different ways discussed
for validation but also appear to be most appropriately
accomplished by the Delphi process.
In order to identify and analyze the various trade-offs
between them, all four types of evaluations should be made
simultaneously. The selected experts are requested to
evaluate, in the context of their own fields, the alternative
concepts for correcting a particular deficiency and to
recommend any other concepts which they may deem appropriate.
After several iterations of interview and mutual feedback
among the various specialists on the panel, a set of concepts
is generated and evaluated which is considered viable under
all four sets of criteria.
For purposes of clarification and illustration, the
procedure described in this section may be displayed In the
context of a three section relevance tree similar to the
one used in PATTERN. In this case, the levels (in order)
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of the elements on any particular level of the tree is
considered desirable, suggested criteria for this purpose
are listed on the left side of Figure 28.
In summary, while none of the five methods discussed in
this study are individually adequate for estimating future
military needs, they can be selectively combined in order to
provide a coordinated means of performing the several types
of processes involved. The composite approach presented
here is designed to "match the tool to the job" by combining
those methods that appear most useful for managing the par-





A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The purpose of this paper, as stated in the introduction,
was to systematically develop and analyze a generalized
procedure for estimating future military needs as a basis
for exploratory R&D planning. In the course of pursuing
this goal, the study examined three different aspects of the
needs estimation problem.
The first portion of the analysis described and analyzed
the elements of the problem in the context of a conceptual
model. The specification of the various inputs as well as
the comparative assessment, analysis, synthesis, and iterative
evaluation processes involved in transforming them into
statements of need were discussed and illustrated. In
addition, an example of the hypothetical operation of the
model was presented.
The second portion of the analysis (Chapter Three)
examined several distinctly different analytic methods by
discussing approaches to needs estimation which have been
founded on them.
Chapter Four dealt with a comparative evaluation of the
various individual methods in terms of their applicability
to needs estimation in general and to this study's conceptual
model in particular. Since none of the individual methods
appeared capable of adequately dealing with all aspects of
the problem as delineated in the model, a composite approach
77

was developed to combine and coordinate several of their most
beneficial characteristics. This approach is structured in
an overall relevance tree framework and is designed to
utilize Delphi and cross-impact techniques in the more
subjective or judgementally oriented areas plus functional
network analysis and threat assessment or simulation in
the objective or easily quantifiable ones.
The procedure developed in this study provides a system-
atic methodology for the estimation of future military needs
in an overall mission-oriented force structure context for
use as the planning base for allocation of exploratory R&D
assets. Its output consists of needs statements as described
in Chapter Two which reflect not only projections of operas
tional deficiencies, but also suggestions of corrective
concepts which appear to merit investigation and exploitation,
B. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This study has not explicitly addressed the tremendous
difficulties involved in implementing the various methods
suggested for use in the composite procedure. Therefore, an
important area of further studies is the actual development
of the processes required. References 21 and 22 indicate
that while the problems associated with developing usable
processes are by no means insurmountable, they are difficult
and time-consuming.
Another equally important area for study involves the
applicability of the proposed procedure for implementation
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at the various cognizant levels of DoD. Since the included
tasks must be performed within the existing bureaucratic
structure, an investigation of the relevant interfaces in
this structure would be extremely valuable. In the same
vein, an in-depth analysis of actual DoD procedures in this
area would be helpful in determining which of these proce-
dures are most useful and how they might be improved and/or
combined to more closely approximate the type of procedure
proposed in this study. As stated previously, the author
intends to examine this latter aspect of the problem in a
related follow-on study which will investigate the existing
needs estimation procedures within DoD and the manner in
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